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I. SECURITY, DIGNITY, AND FREE EXPRESSION
Although freedom of expression is accepted as foundational to most
liberal democracies, the United States is widely considered a "recalcitrant
outlier" regarding the considerable strength of First Amendment
protections provided under the U.S. Constitution.' With regard to protests
in particular, the United States Supreme Court's free speech doctrine forces
government officials to provide sufficient space for protest activities and
bars censorship of their messages.2 In fact, there is a long history of
collective dissent in the United States, ranging from the anti-slavery,
women's suffrage, and civil rights movements to the modem "Tea Party"
and "Occupy" movements. Most recently, the protests arising out of the
deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner at the hands of the police
exemplify this history.3 Arguably, then, the Court's strong protection of
protestors has been a success.
* Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. Special thanks to
Corryn Hall for her able research assistance for this review.
1. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 30 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
2. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Gregory v. City of Chicago,
394 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
28-29 (1949).
3. See, e.g., Ben Kesling, In St. Louis, Protesters Plan an Orderly Response to Indictment News:
Organizers Encourage Crowds to Focus on Constructive Issues, Not Let Violence Overshadow
Demands, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-st-louis-protesters-
plan-an-orderly-response-to-indictment-news-1416178350; Daniel Politi, Tens of Thousands Take to
the Streets to Protest Police Shootings of Unarmed Black Men, SLATE (Dec. 14, 2014, 11:13 AM),
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Despite this long tradition of collective dissent, Professor
Krotoszynski's book, Reclaiming the Petition Clause: Seditious Libel,
"Offensive" Protest, and the Right to Petition the Government for Redress
of Grievances, reveals that peaceful protestors in the United States are
increasingly subjected to restrictive government regulations.4 Such
regulations include using cages to contain protestors, forming massive
walls of police between protestors and others, requiring protestors to use
isolated protest zones, and using military tactics to break up protests.
Courts have routinely upheld these restrictions, effectively deferring to
officials' claims that security concerns justified their actions.'
Given the First Amendment's arguable protection of protestors, what is
the source of such judicial deference? Krotoszynski rightly locates it in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions of speech.6 Earlier Supreme Court decisions protecting
protestors involved government regulations aimed at the allegedly
dangerous content of certain protests.' But the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence is now too hostile toward content-based regulations for them
to be a viable means of regulating protestors. That same jurisprudence is
far more forgiving of content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations
as long as they do not completely suppress speech. Thus, government
officials need only create, as they did in the scenarios discussed in
Krotoszynski's book, a broad regulation of all protestors that appears to
leave some means of protest available (even if only in a cage). After that, a
public safety or national security rationale often satisfies a court.
Reclaiming the Petition Clause thus concludes that the invocation of
security interests is often pretextual or unjustified and serves as a
"cellophane wrapper" insulating government officials from criticism.9
Krotoszynski also recognizes that there are potential justifications for
such an approach, especially when one looks to other countries, which
recognize a stronger dignity interest in individual protection from certain
speech.10 For example, Article I of the German Constitution recognizes that
"Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the slatest/2014/12/14/tens-of thousandsprotestjpolice shootings ofun
armed black men.html.
4. See generally RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, "OFFENSIVE" PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES (2012).
5. Id. at 31-50.
6. Id. at 23-31.
7. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8. See, e.g., RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting that "[c]ontent-based
regulations [of speech] are presumptively invalid" and subject to strict scrutiny).
9. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 55-70.
10. Id. at 70-78.
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duty of all state authority."" Even government officials claim this dignity
interest. Thus, the German Federal Constitutional Court found that it
justified a ban on distributions of humiliating portrayals of an official as a
sex-crazed animal.1 2 Such a ruling stands in stark contrast to U.S. law,
which holds that public officials must endure "'vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks"' in order to protect robust political
debate. 3
In addition, Krotoszynski notes that because Germany is a "militant
democracy," the German constitution does not protect speech "aimed at the
destruction of democratic self-governance." 4 Thus, when otherwise
protected political speech, such as ridiculing the flag or other important
national symbols, potentially undermines democratic order, the
Constitutional Court intimates it can be regulated. 5 As one commentator
has explained Germany's approach,
The attack on the symbol-the flag-is understood to include an
attack on the symbolized-the free democratic basic order. In this
situation, the concept of militant democracy requires the state to
defend itself. Thus, the state has an interest-if not a duty-to
outlaw flag desecration. To formulate this idea differently, the
German flag case presupposes that the state can protect itself
against seditious libel [i.e., the crime of criticizing the
government].16
As Krotoszynski notes, neither the concepts of "militant democracy"
nor individual dignity can serve as an official basis of the U.S. court
decisions.1 7 These concepts find little support in the U.S. law of free
11. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, art. I (Ger.). See also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 32 (2d ed. 1997) ("The principle of human
dignity, as the Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized, is the highest value of the Basic Law,
the ultimate basis of the constitutional order. . . .").
12. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 3, 1987, 75
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 369 (Ger.) [Strauss Caricature
Case].
13. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
14. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 71.
15. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] March 7, 1990,
81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 278 (Ger.) [Flag Desecration
Case].
16. Ute Krtidewagen, Political Symbols in Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag Desecration
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 9 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 679, 709 (2002).
17. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 72.
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expression.18 Furthermore, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme
Court, after surveying the U.S.'s somewhat ugly history with seditious
libel, declared it to be flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment.' 9 Thus,
the Supreme Court noted that "concern for the dignity and reputation" of
government officials, even though accompanied by "'half-truths' and
'misinformation,"' could not justify regulating speech "critical of the
official conduct of public officials." 20 Since Sullivan, the Court has been
antagonistic toward attempts to prosecute seditious libel, especially when it
involves content-based regulations of political speech. 2 1 But Reclaiming the
Petition Clause's most significant insight is that judicial deference to
content-neutral regulations grounded in ephemeral security concerns
effectively revives the defunct crime of seditious libel. Although modern
restrictions on protestors may not be as "outrageous" as obvious seditious
libel prosecutions, their motivation is the same-"avoidance of public
embarrassment ... [as] are the effects of the restrictions on the marketplace
of ideas. Democracy suffers whenever government succeeds in banishing
its critics from public view, regardless of the precise means deployed to
achieve this purpose." 22
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Wood v. Moss23 supports
Krotoszynski's insight. In Moss, the Court concluded that the doctrine of
qualified immunity barred a damages lawsuit against Secret Service agents
who admittedly treated pro-Bush and anti-Bush demonstrators differently.
According to the Court, the anti-Bush protestors could prevail in their
lawsuit only if there existed "'no objectively reasonable security rationale'
for [the agents'] conduct, [and the agents] acted solely to inhibit the
expression of disfavored views." 24 The anti-Bush protestors had alleged a
pattern of ill treatment by the Secret Service over time, which the lower
court believed showed sufficient potential viewpoint discrimination to
overcome a motion to dismiss the complaint and allow the issue to go to
trial.25 The Supreme Court, however, did not believe that the agents'
actions were an attempt to suppress the protestors' viewpoints as opposed
18. See generally Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (rejecting the dignity interest of diplomatic
officials as an interest justifying the regulation of expression).
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). For a discussion of the history
of seditious libel in the United States, see Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, and the Government's Good
Name: Seditious Libel and the Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REv. Disc. 136, 146-151 (2012).
20. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268, 272-73 (citing Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 342, 343, n.5,
345 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
21. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 39-41.
22. Id. at 78.
23. 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014).
24. Id. at 2069.
25. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 675 F.3d 1213, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. Wood v.
Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056.
1162 [Vol. 66:5:1159
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to an attempt to protect the "Nation's 'valid, even. . . overwhelming,
interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive."' 2 6 Accordingly,
qualified immunity protected the agents from a lawsuit altogether. After
Moss, national security is paramount, trumping all but the most unjustified
attempts to censor speech. Of course, with security as a reason to regulate,
one must question whether officials are ever unjustified in suppressing
protests. Security may thus continue to serve as a "cellophane wrapper,"
effectively allowing restriction of protestors critical of the government.
II. REVIVING THE PETITION CLAUSE
Because the Supreme Court's routine free speech jurisprudence seems
to have failed protestors, Reclaiming the Petition Clause proposes other
means to protect them from censorship. Specifically, the book locates
protestors' rights partly in the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, which protects "the right of the people . .. to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." 27 The right to petition
government officials directly was once considered foundational and a
precursor to the rights of speech and assembly in both the U.S. and
England,28 from which much U.S. legal tradition derives. As a method of
protecting citizens' direct access to and engagement with government
officials, the right to petition was "central to the success of the project of
democratic self-government." 29 Krotoszynski ably demonstrates that early
forms of petitioning had distinct overtones of collective action, involving
such activities as mass meetings, protests and distribution of circulars to
rally the public to support particular important causes. 30 This historical
entanglement of the right to protest and the right to petition thus makes
Krotoszynski's linkage of them logical. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme
Court has shown little inclination to recognize the right to petition as
separate from the broader right to free expression.31 As a result, protestors
are not treated as presenting grievances to government officials but rather
as engaging in generic expressive activity subject to the somewhat tepid
time, place, and manner regulations described above.
Krotoszynski argues for reviving the petition right and using it to
protect "petitioning" protest activity, which he defines as collective
expressive action with the object of changing a policy or practice of
government officials and which also engenders a wide consideration of the
26. Wood, 134 S. Ct. at 2067 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. KROTOSZYNSKI,supra note 4, at 81-135.
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id. at 90.
31. Id. at 157-62.
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policy question within the community.32 Krotoszynski argues that
petitioning protestors fundamentally have the right to be free from seditious
libel prosecutions as well as an affirmative right to be heard.3 ' To ensure
these fundamental aspects of the petitioning right, he argues for a judicial
presumption "in favor of [petitioning protestors'] access to government
officials .. . at least from the vantage point of traditional public forums."34
Although he notes that "government officials should have some discretion
to structure how this access will occur," Krotoszynski posits that
petitioning protests should receive consideration for their preferred means
of expression.3" Finally, Krotoszynski argues judges should not allow
government officials to use illusory or unproven security concerns to
suppress protests simply because protestors are critical of government
policies. He does not discard security as an important interest; rather, he
notes that more careful judicial scrutiny of such justifications is in order.37
III. BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROTESTS
Krotoszynski's book is an important contribution to the emerging
literature on protests. His focus on judges' failure to rein in excessive
government restrictions on protestors and his proposal to solve the problem
make sense given that strong judicial review largely shapes the United
States' system of freedom of expression (and contributes to its free speech
exceptionalism).3 8 Certainly, judicial deference to current governmental
abuse of time, place, and manner regulations is problematic. It signals to
officials that they need merely provide minimal rationales for their actions
and allows surreptitious censorship. Ultimately, weak judicial review
undermines core concepts underlying the Supreme Court's free speech
jurisprudence, such as its antipathy toward seditious libel.
Despite the book's insights, it only partly identifies and resolves the
problems associated with regulating protests. Weak judicial review of time,
place, and manner requirements is not the sole problem affecting protestors
in the United States; nor will strengthening such review solve the problems
Krotoszynski identifies. Rather, a variety of governmental tactics involving
protestors-tactics that are used worldwide and not exceptional to the
United States-elude effective judicial review. Until we come to grips with
these types of restrictions on protestors, focusing only on strengthening
32. Id. at 164-66.
33. Id. at 166.
34. Id
35. Id. at 166-67.
36. Id at 169-70.
37. Id at 172-73.
38. Schauer, supra note 1, at 50.
1164 [Vol. 66:5:1159
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judicial review within the Court's existing free speech framework is merely
a temporary and unduly narrow fix.
For example, aggressive police responses have a significant effect on
protestors regardless of available judicial review. A report authored by
International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations recently surveyed
government responses to mass protests in nine countries, including the
United States, Israel, Canada, Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, Kenya, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom. The report identified similarities across
governmental responses, which included widespread use of excessive force
against peaceful demonstrators, unsupported claims that the police response
was required to quell violence or incitement to violence, and mass arrests
of peaceful protestors.i Similar research suggests the use of increasingly
aggressive or military-style tactics by police in the United States in
response to generally peaceful protests.40 Such tactics chill speech by
instilling fear of bodily harm in protestors and by the "intensive violations
of personal integrity that [excessive force] necessarily involves."A1
Even in the United States, where protestors can challenge illegal
arrests, courts often have few opportunities to assess whether protestors'
free speech rights are violated. In the United States, police often arrest
protestors not for their expression but for other minor crimes, such as
jaywalking or trespass. 42 Such arrests allow police to control protestors
without actually arresting them for their expressive activity. Courts analyze
protestors' challenges to police action in these cases almost exclusively
under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Hence, judges seek
to determine whether police had "probable cause" to arrest a protestor or
whether the police used excessive force in effectuating an arrest. Both
standards are deferential and favor the government.43 They also rarely
invoke questions regarding the burden that the arrest poses on the
protestors' free expression rights. Accordingly, across jurisdictions, police,
39. See generally INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANIZATIONS, "TAKE
BACK THE STREETS": REPRESSION AND CRIMINALIZATION OF PROTEST AROUND THE WORLD (2013),
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/global_protest-suppression report inclo.pdf. Amnesty
International also recently issued a report documenting similar abuse in Brazil during protests leading
up to the World Cup. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "THEY USE A STRATEGY OF FEAR": PROTECTING
THE RIGHT TO PROTEST IN BRAZIL (2014), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR19/005/2014/en/.
40. See Alicia A. D'Addario, Policing Protest: Protecting Dissent and Preventing Violence
Through First and Fourth Amendment Law, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 97-98 (2006); John
Noakes & Patrick F. Gillham, Aspects of the 'New Penology' in the Police Response to Major Political
Protests in the United States, 1999-2000, in THE POLICING OF TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST 97, 108
(Donnatella Della Porta et al. eds., 2006); Jerome H. Skolnick, Democratic Policing Confronts Terror
and Protest, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 191, 204-09 (2005).
41. D'Addario, supra note 40, at 110.
42. See Noakes & Gillham, supra note 40, at 113.
43. See D'Addario, supra note 40, at 114-16.
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rather than judges, are primarily responsible for decisions to quell peaceful
protest.
Furthermore, in many situations protestors may have no opportunity to
challenge their arrests at all. In situations involving arrests of protestors for
disorderly conduct or similar protest-related crimes, prosecutors often
dismiss criminal charges against protestors soon after their arrest. Such
dismissals may leave protestors with little incentive to bring time-
consuming and burdensome lawsuits challenging the free speech violations
that occurred as a result of policing tactics. Dismissals may have their own
chilling effect if they are conditioned on the protestor's good behavior for a
certain period of time.4 The requirement that a protestor remain free of
arrest for several months in order to prevent reinstatement of charges is
likely to deter them from engaging in protest activity, where they may be
arrested again (even if pretextually). Just as surely as a prosecution for
seditious libel, these tactics chill free expression. But Krotoszynski's
proposal does not clearly remedy either of these situations since it focuses
primarily on rectifying the Supreme Court's approach to review of content-
neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.
Other police activities regarding protestors can have similarly chilling
effects. For example, officials in various countries, including the United
States, use surveillance to target and counter peaceful protestors.4 5
Accordingly, law enforcement officials thwart protests by engaging in
online surveillance to gather information about the protestors, using it to
facilitate pretextual arrests, and participating in coercive information
gathering through individual interrogations of protestors.46 In addition,
many journalists covering protests have been harassed or arrested.47 Under
existing law, surveillance rarely violates protestors' First Amendment
rights.48 And the legal issues surrounding arrests of journalists are only now
being clarified in the United States. 49 Surveillance of protestors and arrests
44. Victoria Cavaliere, Charges Dismissed in Last Cases from Occupy Wall Street March,
REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2013, 5:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/us-usa-occupy-cases-
idUSBRE99713H20131008 (noting that over half of the 2,600 people arrested agreed to dismissal
conditioned on their not being arrested again within six months).
45. See Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 145, 167-68 (2012) (discussing surveillance of Middle East uprisings in 2011).
46. See Noakes & Gillham, supra note 40, at I10-11; Joseph Goldstein, Police Warrant Squads
Were Used to Monitor Wall Street Protestors, Suspects Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2012, at A29.
47. See, e.g., NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREE SPEECH THREAT ASSESSMENT # 1:
POLICING PROTEST IN NEW YORK CITY 1-2 (2012), available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/freespeech-threat-assessment-report_080712_partl.pdf.
48. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1972).
49. Compare ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illinois
wiretapping law as applied to person taking photos of police activity in public place), and Glik v.
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting police officers' qualified immunity defense to a civil
rights lawsuit arising from the officers' arrest of a citizen attempting to film their actions in a public
[Vol. 66:5:11591166
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of journalists are likely to chill protest activity or at the very least
manipulate the public's access to protestors' messages. Nevertheless,
Krotoszynski's proposal, which focuses primarily on judicial review of
direct restrictions to protestors' rights, does not clearly remedy these
problems.
The protests erupting in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014 after the
police shooting of Michael Brown exemplify the shortcomings of
Krotoszynski's proposal. Although the protests were initially largely
peaceful,o they were met with heavy-handed police tactics, ranging from a
demand that protestors demonstrate in a "respectful manner" to use of tear
gas, rubber bullets and snipers.5 1 The ACLU eventually won a restraining
order against the County of St. Louis, but it did not cover any of these
tactics. Rather, it prohibited implementation of an identifiable policy
barring protestors from congregating for more than five seconds in any one
place.52 Such a policy is the kind of official action to which judicial review
is suited but the restraining order did not (and likely could not have)
prevented the tactics described above because they are part of the current
landscape of discretionary policing. Similarly, numerous reports of arrested
journalists have surfaced during the Ferguson protests, despite the
existence of an ACLU lawsuit and eventual signed agreement with the
County of St. Louis noting that "the media and members of the public have
a right to record public events without abridgement unless it obstructs the
activity or threatens the safety of others, or physically interferes with the
ability of law enforcement officers to perform their duties."54 Again,
Professor Krotoszynski's proposal for judicial review, while workable in
the context of direct restrictions such as the five-second policy, does not
clearly help in the murky area of information gathering.
park), with Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding police officers had
qualified immunity to civil suit brought by individual arrested for recording a traffic stop).
50. For a brief description of the timeline and evolution of the Ferguson protests, see Abdullah v.
County of St. Louis, Mo., No. 4:14CV1436 CDP, 2014 WL 4979314, at *1-4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6.2014)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
51. Dahlia Lithwick & Daria Roithmayr, Ferguson's Constitutional Crisis: On the Streets of
Missouri, It's Not Just the First Amendment That's Being Violated, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2014, 7:45 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/ferguson-s constitutionalcrisi
s firstamendment violations are onlypart.html; John Nichols, The Constitutional Crisis in
Ferguson, Missouri, THE NATION (Aug. 14, 2014, 2:09 PM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/181145/police-overreaction-has-become-constitutional-crisis-ferguson-
missouri#.
52. Abdullah, 2014 WL 4979314, at *10.
53. Kurtis Lee, Journalist Trey Yingst Arrested During Ferguson, Mo., Protests, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2014, 4:48 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ferguson-reporter-arrest-
20141123-story.html.
54. Hussein v. Cnty. of St. Louis, No. 4:14-CV-1410-JAR (E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2014)




None of this is meant to denigrate the value of Professor
Krotoszynski's insights or his proposal. It is extraordinarily important to
have a strong system of judicial review if a system of free expression is to
thrive. Reclaiming the Petition Clause also begins an important
discussion regarding the role of seditious libel in regulating protestors and
its relationship to judicial review. Worldwide trends, however, suggest that
the locus of control regarding regulation of protestors has shifted from
judges to law enforcement officials. Although judicial deference within the
current structure of free speech doctrine may account for some of this shift
in the United States, other factors beyond judicial doctrine are also at work.
United States free speech law, and specifically our approach to judicial
review, must explicitly account for such things as surveillance, pretextual
arrests, arrests of journalists, and other tactics that interfere with protestors'
expression. Simply tweaking the level of review associated with the
Court's current standards will solve only part of the problem.
55. Schauer, supra note 1, at 50 (noting that protection of free expression "is likely to be
stronger, controlling for all other variables, in those countries in which the traditions of judicial review
and judicial supremacy are longer and stronger").
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